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Clancy v. State, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 89 (November 27, 2013)1
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Summary
A three-judge panel of the Court2 considered three questions: (1) whether NRS
484E.010-0303 require actual knowledge that an accident has occurred, or whether
constructive knowledge is sufficient; (2) whether the definition of “involved in an
accident” in the same statute is unconstitutionally vague or ambiguous; and (3) whether
the evidence in this case was sufficient to support the guilty verdict handed down in the
lower court.
Disposition/Outcome
(1) The statute requires actual or constructive knowledge of an accident. (2) The
definition of “involved in an accident” in this statute is not unconstitutionally vague or
ambiguous. (3) A rational trier of fact could have found the evidence to establish guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore the evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict.
Factual and Procedural History
Clancy was driving to work on the freeway when he merged in front of a
motorcycle, causing it to crash. According to two witnesses, his vehicle physically struck
the motorcycle; a third saw the merger, but could not testify as to whether Clancy’s
vehicle physically struck the motorcycle. After the motorcycle crashed, one of the
witnesses saw Clancy look over his shoulder, and then accelerate away and exit the
freeway, well before the exit for his workplace. A Nevada Highway Patrol officer,
apprised of Clancy’s license plate number, went to Clancy’s work and saw marks on
Clancy’s right rear panel, at about the height of the motorcycle. The officer then arrested
Clancy.
At trial, Clancy’s expert witness opined that the marks on Clancy’s vehicle were
not enough to indicate a collision between the two vehicles. The State did not provide an
opposing witness, but did cross-examine the expert as to whether there could have been
contact between the two vehicles that could have resulted in the motorcycle crash without
causing significant damage to Clancy’s vehicle. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and
Clancy appealed on the issues above.
Discussion
NRS 484E.010 requires knowledge that an accident occurred.
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Nevada’s “Leaving the Scene of a Crime” statute. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 484E.010-030 (2013).	
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By its terms, the statute does not require a particular state of knowledge.
However, since strict liability offenses are generally disfavored,4 the Court looks to the
Legislature’s intent.5 Since the purpose of this statute is to encourage drivers to stop
when they may have caused an accident, but it would be absurd to punish drivers who do
not realize that an accident has occurred.6 However, requiring the State to prove actual
knowledge would defeat the purpose of the statute, since it would encourage drivers
without actual knowledge to not to stop after a potential accident, lest they incur liability.
Hence, the Court held that either actual or constructive knowledge is sufficient for the
scienter element.
NRS 484E.010 is not unconstitutionally vague or ambiguous.
Clancy argued that the phrase “involved in an accident” in NRS 484.010(1) is
unconstitutionally vague or ambiguous, because it does not specify whether the phrase
requires physical contact between two vehicles or not. A statute is unconstitutionally
vague “(1) if it ‘fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is
prohibited’ or (2) if it ‘is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously
discriminatory enforcement.’”7 The Court reviewed dictionary definitions, as well as
interpretations of similar language in other states, and held that NRS 484.010(1) gives
fair notice that it applies to a no-contact accident, and does not encourage discriminatory
enforcement, and is therefore not unconstitutionally vague or ambiguous.
Evidence was sufficient to support the verdict.
Although one of the witnesses could not testify as to whether physical contact
took place, NRS 484.010(1) does not require physical contact. Thus, three witnesses
testified that Clancy was involved in an accident. In addition, the expert testified that
there was no evidence of a collision—not that there was no accident altogether. Finally,
one witness saw Clancy act in a way which could suggest he had indeed seen the
accident, and was leaving the scene. Based on all of this evidence, the Court found that a
reasonable trier of fact could have convicted Clancy.
Conclusion
The Court affirmed Clancy’s conviction in the lower court. It held that NRS
484.010-030 require actual or constructive knowledge of an accident, and that NRS
484.010(1) does not require physical contact between two vehicles.
4

Ford v. State, 127 Nev. __, ___, 262 P.3d 1123, 1127 (2011).
Moore v. State, 111 Nev. 659, 661, 27 P.3d 447, 449 (2001).
6
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